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What do Commissars do? 
JAGDISH N. BHAGWATI* 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
Summary. - The note considers the possible interaction between the narrowing of wage 
differentials in China and the degree of hierarchy-cum-supervision at the plant level in the 
Chinese economy. It is argued that the Chinese regime may end up with greater hierarchy in its 
techniques of production, paradoxically, as a result of the narrowing of wage differentials. In 
developing this thesis, the note raises an issue of novelty in the theory of comparative conomic 
systems. 
Among the interesting facts and impressions 
with which Sinologists have come out of China 
are two: 
(1) that the wage differentials have been 
narrowed dramatically vis-ir-vis both KMT 
China and the capitalist world outside;’ and 
(2) that, despite the tendency to send intel- 
lectuals (both as a ‘corrective’ to their 
bourgeois sentiments and as ‘punishment’)2 to 
occasional furloughs in the countryside, the 
Marxist notion of the ‘compleat man’ is not 
seen to be an objective of policy: indeed, 
according to John Gurley, who lectured at MIT 
in October 1972 after a three-week US-radical- 
economists’ tour of China, the tendency 
towards ‘specialization’ in jobs was no smaller, 
and perhaps even more pronounced, if impres- 
sions were any guide. 
Impressions are, of course, often treacherous 
guides; and in Sinology, where facts are scarce 
and enthusiasm abundant, a willing suspension 
of disbelief-T. S. Eliot’s sure guide to aesthetic 
pleasure but also the certain road to scientific 
failure--much too often seems to displace hard, 
scholarly scrutiny. 
In this instance, the impression that perhaps 
the Chinese are, if anything, over-specializing 
the tasks of their workers-thus, presumably, in 
that regard, reinforcing the Smith-Ricardian 
tendency to division of labour and specializa- 
tion-is, if correct, a paradox. And, since the 
ideological bias of the radical observer of China 
is likely to be in the direction of stressing the 
Chinese achievements in socialism, this possible 
paradox is both probable and worthy of an 
explanation. 
I would argue that the two phenomena listed 
above-the reduction of wage differentials and 
the failure in such an egalitarian society to 
reorganize tasks so as to ‘enrich’ work by 
reducing specialization and hence hierarchy3 
-are not merely likely to reflect differences in 
* This note is written in a somewhat light vein, but 
is addressed to raising an analytical question of 
novelty and also some importance in the theory of 
comparative economic analysis. I am indebted to 
Michael Piore for bringing the Butera (1972) paper to 
my attention; the discussion of workers’ control by 
Sheldon Friedman, Michael Weinstein and others in 
the Political Economy and Theory Seminar at MIT 
was also stimulating. Bent Hansen, Paul Streeten, T. N. 
Srinivasan and Martin Weitzman have made useful 
comments. Thanks are due to the National Science 
Foundation for financial support; the research 
facilities of the Institute for International Economic 
Studies, Stockholm, are also appreciated. 
1. See, for example, lshikawa (1972) p. 344. 
2. See Goldman (1971) for examples of Chinese 
literary intellectuals who were occasionally sent to the 
countryside as part of ‘rectification’ programmes. 
3. I am assuming, as is evident below, that job 
enrichment via reduced specialization is correlated 
technologically with reduced hierarchy (resulting from 
a reduced need for supervision) in the organization of 
work at the plant level. I am also abstracting from the 
possibility that, if a ‘third’ factor, say ‘capital’, is also 
cheapened (as it may well be if capital is not 
adequately priced as in early communist phases), then 
the effect I am discussing may not be inferrable 
without further restrictions on the degrees of price 
changes and the nature of the substitution- 
complementarity relationships. Further, it is obvious 
that the ‘enrichment’ of work may lead to reclassifica- 
tion of the supervised workers and increase their 
absolute wages. 
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Figure 1 
the priority and sequence in which the fully- 
socialist society is sought to be realized, but 
could also be functionally related to each other. 
More directly, the reduction of wage differen- 
tials, such that the socialist society rewards the 
‘supervisors’ (and ‘foremen’) less, could create 
incentives, in microdecision-making at the plant 
level, to choose ‘techniques’ which involve the 
use of relatively more supervisors, rather than 
less. A neoclassical (i.e., cost-minimizing) 
commissar at the plant level may, ceferis 
paribus, have an incentive to opt out of the 
*socialist objective of the compleat man as wage 
differentials reduce. 
Thus, consider Figure 1 where ‘supervisors’ 
and the ‘supervised’ are measured along the 
vertical and horizontal axes, respectively. For 
any specified output level, let the point C 
represent the ‘capitalist’-type process of pro- 
duction. The reduced-hierarchy type of process, 
on the other hand, is represented by a lowered 
ratio of supervisors to the supervised: the 
underlying technological assumption is that 
increased specialization (e.g., a conveyor-belt 
process) involves more supervision per (super- 
vised) worker. Let this alternative ‘technique’ 
of organizing the work process be OS (less steep 
than OC). 
Now, in general, as the relative price of the 
supervisors falls, the neoclassical commissar will 
have an increased incentive to choose the 
‘capitalist’ technique OC in preference to the 
‘socialist’ technique OS. But what actual choice 
emerges depends, of course, on (i) the degree of 
reduction of the wage differential between the 
supervised and the supervisors and (ii) whether 
the constant-produce point on OS, correspond- 
ing to point C on OC, is in Zone I (RS+), Zone 
II (QR) or Zone III (OQ). 
Zone I, of course, is dominated costwise by 
C and would therefore not be observed by a 
visiting Sinologist: the neoclassical commissar 
would rule it out. Zone III would imply that 
the Sinologist should observe the ‘socialist’ 
technique: but so would he observe it in the 
capitalist world: hence there would be no 
difference between the two systems. 
The really interesting contrast, and our 
paradox, could arise in Zone II, where a 
sufficient reduction in the wage differential 
could make the socialist society choose the 
‘capitalist’ technique while the capitalist society 
with wider wage differentials chose the 
‘socialist’ technique. Is this happening in China? 
In conclusion, some further points must be 
noted. 
(1) While the plant-level choice of tech- 
nology will indeed be deflected, ceteris pnribus, 
to ‘capitalist-type’ techniques as wage differen- 
tials are narrowed, one may well ask whether 
the supplies of the supervisors and the super- 
vised would not react so that the reduced 
incentives reduce the over-all supply of super- 
visors and hence increase the aggregate ratio of 
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the supervised to the supervisors. This is, how- 
ever, not a serious objection if, on the basis of 
reports about decentralized decisionmaking in 
China, one argues that the derived demands for 
supervisors and the supervised, emerging from 
plants across China, are aggregated and matched 
by Peking via manpower planning. 
(2) We know precious little about the 
possibility of varying techniques in the sense of 
Figure 1, although much is known about the 
usual substitution of capital for labour in all 
sorts of ways.4 Nor can we do more than 
speculate, if such variation were to obtain, as to 
which zone the ‘socialist’ technique would tend 
to lie in. Among the interesting empirical 
discussions of such a choice is that by Butera 
(1972) who has reported on the systematic 
attempt by Olivetti-paradoxically, a capitalist 
firm-to reorganize its task requirements of 
design on two major products in 1972, so as to 
assign more responsibility and richness in work 
to workers.5 The new job designs did reduce, as 
it happens, the degree of supervision that the 
original Taylorian method of organizing the 
assembly line (with duller jobs and ‘excessive’ 
specialization in tasks down the line) had 
required.6 
(3) Another question of interest is: when 
would firms develop these ‘socialist’ techniques 
of production? This is virtually the same pro- 
blem, of course, as that raised by the direction 
of R & D research. There are two routes that 
may be taken here, both of which would seem 
to bear on the question of whether the socialist 
society was likely, in the long run, to direct R 
& D towards developing ‘socialist’ (i.e., 
OS-type) techniques. 
(i) The first approach is ‘economic’. Do 
reduced wage differentials, aside from favouring 
the choice of ‘capitalist’-techniques from the 
given smorgasbord of techniques, also make R 
& D oriented towards developing new 
‘capitalist’, rather than ‘socialist’, techniques? 
We already know that the direction of the 
search process must really be independent of 
the current factor prices: thus the notion that 
dear labour prompts capital-using innovation is 
not logically tenable.7 On the other hand, one 
can sustain a more limited statement: that, as 
between two economies with different capital- 
labour price-ratios, the pay-offs from the same 
search would be greater for capital-intensive 
innovation in the capital-cheap country and 
therefore, comparatively speaking, the R & D 
effort of the capital-rich country would be 
tilted in favour of the capital-using-innovation 
zone. It is undoubtedly this logic which leads, 
for example, to the fact that, in a QR-ridden 
India where locally-available materials are 
relatively. much cheaper than imports, one finds 
relatively greater R & D orientation towards 
producing local-material-using technical 
change.8 Thus, one could say that a socialist 
society with reduced wage differentials may 
also find its R & D oriented relatively more 
towards searching for ‘capitalist’-type tech- 
niques! Full socialism would thus get further 
away from grasp! 
(ii) But this argument should be immedi- 
ately qualified by the fact that politically a 
socialist society may well be searching for 
‘socialist’-type techniques. The ‘economic’ 
argument spelled out in (i) above pertains to 
what decentralized, micro-level commissars 
would be working towards, if left to them- 
selves. But the political objectives could well set 
a centralized policy on R & D, under which the 
R & D-search could well be reversed in the 
‘socialist’ direction. Whether, in fact, the 
Chinese communists have this political objec- 
tive, which could eventually generate such 
work-process job designs of a ‘socialist’ type is 
not, however, readily obvious.9 Indeed, there 
4. See Bhagwati (1966) Ch. 20, for a discussion of 
alternative ways in which techniques may be varied 
even when the ‘equipment’ is given. A recent 
theoretical paper of interest in this connection is 
Arrow, Levhari and Sheshinski (1972). 
5. Other examples of such efforts include Xerox, 
Volvo, General Foods and Phillips; all of them seem to 
support the notion that the degree of supervision falls 
off as jobs are enriched. 
6. Unfortunately, however, until more systematic 
data become available, it is not possible to determine 
which zone the new techniques lay in. 
7. Recall the familiar literature on the problem: 
Kennedy (1964), and Samuelson (1965), (1966). 
8. See Bhagwati and Srimvasan (1975) Ch. 12. There 
is also a thesis in progress on R & D in the Indian dyes 
and pharmaceuticals industry, by Bruce Kutnick 
(1975), which explores this hypothesis systematically. 
9. Marglin (1971) has recently argued that the 
historic origin of hierarchy in job design is the 
capitalist intention to ‘divide and rule’ over the 
overly-specialized workers. While his thesis is logically 
incomplete-it does not satisfactorily deal with the 
question of free entry, for example-and historically 
not necessarily accurate, it is suggestive. On the other 
hand, Soviet experience shows clearly that neither 
workers’ control nor job-enrichment-anddiversifica- 
tion has been the outcome of a socialist revolution. 
Can it be that the logic of the dictatorship of the 
proletariat requires that industrial organization also 
should reflect discipline and lead perhaps to a general 
preference for techniques which involve greater 
hierarchy at plant level? 
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seems to be practically nothing in the literature 
on Chinese social and political objectives that 
suggests that this is one of the centrally-held- 
and-pursued objectives of the Chinese govem- 
ment. The paradox of the neoclassical 
commissar therefore may well endure into the 
future. 
(4) In conclusion, it is probably worth 
noting explicitly that the argumentation in this 
note relates to specialization (and hence the 
ratio of supervisors to the supervised) within 
enterprises. As Bent Hansen has correctly 
pointed out to me, however, the capitalist 
system may well be more economical also in 
the use of ‘supervisors’ in between-enterprise 
specialization because there is likely to be 
greater reliance on the market. Even then, one 
might argue that,.in place of supervision-cum- 
so-ordination, the capitalist system may absorb 
resources in the form of a ‘superstructure’ 
consisting of salesmen, Madison Avenue, etc. 
Furthermore, as Paul Streeten has commented 
to me, the relatively decentralized socialist 
regimes (such as China presumably) are likely 
to require a smaller bureaucracy supervising- 
cum-co-ordinating at the over-all between- 
enterprise level than the centralized socialist 
regimes (such as the Soviet Union). 
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